Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power
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This article pushes beyond hard power and soft power to insist on smart power, defined as the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently. It argues that advancing smart power has become a national security imperative, driven both by long-term structural changes in international conditions and by short-term failures of the current administration. The current debates over public diplomacy and soft power suffer from failures to address conceptual, institutional, and political dimensions of the challenge, three dimensions the author addresses in this article.

Keywords: foreign policy; public diplomacy; soft power; smart power

There is much sentiment in the United States and abroad that the current design and conduct of American foreign policy is flawed and needs to be repaired. Unfortunately, the debate itself is also flawed: neither the advocates of soft power nor the proponents of hard power have adequately integrated their positions into a single framework to advance the national interest. Advocates of soft power and public diplomacy tend to frame their arguments poorly; their positions are often politically naïve and institutionally weak. Meanwhile, hard power proponents, who are politically and institutionally powerful, frequently frame their arguments inadequately because they seem to believe they can safely ignore or simply subsume elements of national power that lie outside their traditional purview. The consequence

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is that the national interest is being badly served by an imperfect, dichotomous debate.

As we enter the transition period leading up to a new administration, important conversations will take place on the campaign trail, in party conclaves, and in Washington think tanks about the incoming administration’s foreign policy priorities. In the past, such conversations have been shaped mostly by traditional hard power concerns. As we look toward the future, soft power calculations should figure far more prominently in the design of American national security and foreign policies.

This article aims to provide a smart power framework for debating these competing claims and for improving foreign policy performance. It first explains why new structural and conjunctural conditions require smart power and then analyzes the conceptual, institutional, and political challenges that must be met to accelerate America’s achievement of smart power. The article draws from a yearlong project involving an international blog-based conversation (www.smartpowerblog.org), an ongoing research seminar and a series of colloquia where the term has been critically debated. It also coincides with the important work conducted by the recently formed Commission on Smart Power, led by Joseph Nye and Richard Armitage at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

Why Attention to Smart Power Now?

The growing interest in smart power reflects two contemporary trends, one structural and long-term, the other short-term and conjunctural, driven mainly by the policies of the current administration. The most obvious reason to reflect seriously on smart power is because of the widely perceived shortcomings of the policies of the U.S. administration over the past seven years. There is widespread belief in America and around the world that the Bush administration’s national security and foreign policies have not been smart, even on their own terms, and, as a result, that they have compromised the diplomatic and security interests of the United States, provoked unprecedented resentment around the world, and greatly diminished America’s position in the world (Kohut and Stokes 2006; Pew Global Attitudes Project 2006; Halper and Clarke 2004).

In contrast, leaders in other countries have been more sophisticated in their use of the instruments of power. Though not without significant flaws, the leadership of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), for example, has deployed power resources strategically. The individual policy choices made by President Hu Jiantao and his advisors have reflected a sophisticated analysis of the world as it is; and they have deployed a balanced, integrated array of instruments to achieve their narrow political goals as well as to advance their national purposes. Hu’s decisions to develop and consistently pursue a doctrine of “China’s Peaceful Rise” is a clear counterpoint to President George W. Bush’s approach, which has
focused largely on the need to maintain military superiority. Yet both approaches constitute clear examples of policy calculations made by a powerful country’s leadership that is relatively independent and not inevitably shaped by structural factors. The leadership of the PRC made conscious decisions to pursue this smarter course. It could have pursued a strategy of “China’s Militant Rise.” It could have been diplomatically dysfunctional in its treatment of African nations and clumsy in its pursuit of oil and mineral resources; instead, it created what Josh Kurlantzick (2007) called a multifaceted “charm campaign” offering African leaders foreign assistance and high-level attention. Likewise, it could have ignored Europe and relied mostly on hard power across the straits of Taiwan. While the charm offensive of the PRC has yielded mixed results, it was based on a sophisticated appreciation for the full range of instruments of national power.

[T]he G-8 nations are accelerating their transformation from industrial to postindustrial economies, where power increasingly rests on a nation’s capacity to create and manipulate knowledge and information. A country’s capacity for creativity and innovation can trump its possession of armored divisions or aircraft carriers, and new hi-tech tools can greatly enhance the reach of military and nonmilitary influence.

But the current thirst for smart power is not driven only by the good or bad choices of individual leaders. Even if the U.S. administration had not displayed so many weaknesses of its own making, there are some longer-term secular trends that would have provoked a demand for a new way to conceive of and exercise state power. In a nutshell, the G-8 nations are accelerating their transformation from industrial to postindustrial economies, where power increasingly rests on a nation’s capacity to create and manipulate knowledge and information. A country’s capacity for creativity and innovation can trump its possession of armored divisions or aircraft carriers, and new hi-tech tools can greatly enhance the reach of military and nonmilitary influence. Armies and militaries remain
important, but their relative role has changed radically, in terms both of how the military conducts warfare and in the mix of military to nonmilitary assets. The world of warfare has become more digital, networked, and flexible, and nonmilitary assets like communications have risen in the mix of instruments of state power (Arguilla and Ronfeldt 1999).

Sophisticated nations have everything from smart bombs to smart phones to smart blogs. And as states get smarter, so too do nonstate actors like Al Qaeda in their use of the media across multiple platforms (Brachman 2006; Thomas 2003). Any actor that aspires to enhance its position on the world stage has to build strategies around these new fundamentals of “smartness.”

Smart strategies must also take into account the shifting influence among traditional states, with the rise of India, China, Brazil, and other actors on the world stage, since the old cold war dichotomies have collapsed. Their new power imposes new constraints on the unilateral actions of the more established G-8 nations, including the United States. Designing foreign policies cognizant of new technological capacities and new actors requires greater sophistication than in the past.

A final reason for the hunt for smart power today is that target populations themselves have become “smarter.” With the steady spread of secondary and higher education and the availability of more media outlets, populations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America have grown much more affluent, more sophisticated and knowledgeable about their own and other societies, and less easily influenced by the exercise of soft or hard power. These newly educated populations demand to be treated differently than in the past; as their world becomes more urban and more middle class, individuals are becoming more assertive. The spread of democratic practices has meant that foreign leaders also have less leeway than in the past to act as American surrogates, as stand-ins for American power from over the horizon. Democracy places distinct constraints on the design and conduct of U.S. foreign policy just as it provides opportunities.

In brief, the world has become smarter, and America’s reigning foreign policy elites have not kept up. Until very recently, the Bush administration officials have demonstrated an unwillingness or inability to conceive of and deploy power creatively, in ways appropriate to our times, and synthesizing the strengths of the different instruments of state power. Alas, this has proven a bipartisan problem, as the previous Democratic administration was not a paragon of smart power either, with serious missteps in its initial efforts to mix military power, trade, and diplomatic influence.

The Search for Smart Power

Not surprisingly, the un-smart use of power has provoked a smart power countermovement. In the United States and abroad, one hears constant calls for far-reaching reforms coming from all points of the political compass, and across the communities of hard and soft power advocates, from neoliberals to reformed neoconservatives (Korb, Boorstin, and Center for American Progress 2005;
Chomsky 2002; Haas 2005; Halper and Clarke 2004; Nossel 2004; Princeton Project on National Security 2006). Not surprisingly, the harshest critiques have come from the backers of diplomacy, both traditional and public, and other forms of soft power. But their arguments suffer from a number of serious flaws, illustrating a need for

1. better definitions and conceptualizations of the meaning of hard and soft power;
2. greater attention to the institutional realities that underlie the ways these meanings are articulated; and
3. a more systematic effort to incorporate real-world political dynamics that must be involved in any shift toward smart power doctrines, as well as a more aggressive attempt to engage politically with the issues in ways that are consistent and consequential.

To enhance the effectiveness of hard and soft power deployed individually, and combined into smart power, we must redress these three issues: provide more precise and sophisticated definitions, carefully analyze the institutions of hard and soft power, and be much more clear-eyed about the political dynamics required to support the integration of hard and soft power in the creation of smart power.

Conceptual and Definitional Challenges

In international politics, having “power” is having the ability to influence another to act in ways in which that entity would not have acted otherwise. Hard power is the capacity to coerce them to do so. Hard power strategies focus on military intervention, coercive diplomacy, and economic sanctions to enforce national interests (Art 1996; Campbell and O’Hanlon 2006; Cooper 2004; Wagner 2005). In academic writing, it is the neorealist approaches that tend to emphasize hard power, especially the hard power of states, while liberal institutionalist scholars emphasize soft power as an essential resource of statecraft (along with the power to write the rules of the game, a curiously missing element in contemporary conversations of hard and soft power).

In contrast to coercive power, soft power is the capacity to persuade others to do what one wants. A powerful formulation first introduced by Joseph Nye in 1990, and expanded in his later works, soft power has become a central analytic term in foreign policy discussions. Nye defined it as the ability to get what one wants through persuasion or attraction rather than coercion (Nye 1990). It builds attraction and encompasses nearly everything other than economic and military power (Cooper 2004). Nye (2004) stated, “In terms of resources, soft-power resources are the assets that produce such attraction.” The term is not without its critics, dissatisfied either with the concept or its application. One Canadian author, for example, claimed that conventional hard and soft power concepts are inappropriate for Canada; confusion results as analysts “attempt to graft an American-originated concept onto the Canadian political landscape” (Smith-Windsor 2005). As seen in his work with the CSIS Commission, Nye is also wrestling with the idea of smart power.
Reframing the Issue

This article defines smart power as the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor’s purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently.

A conceptually robust and policy-relevant framework for smart power should be built on a few additional core considerations: ³

- The target over which one seeks to exercise power—its internal nature and its broader global context. Power cannot be smart if those who wield it are ignorant of these attributes of the target populations and regions.
- Self-knowledge and understanding of one’s own goals and capacities. Smart power requires the wielder to know what his or her country or community seeks, as well as its will and capacity to achieve its goals.
- The broader regional and global context within which the action will be conducted.
- The tools to be employed, as well as how and when to deploy them individually and in combination.

[A] genuinely sophisticated smart power approach comes with the awareness that hard and soft power constitute not simply neutral “instruments” to be wielded neutrally by an enlightened, all-knowing, and independent philosopher king; they themselves constitute separate and distinct institutions and institutional cultures that exert their own normative influences over their members, each with its own attitudes, incentives, and anticipated career paths.

Each of these factors deserves far more attention than is possible in a single article, but it is important to elaborate briefly on the matter of “tools” since they are so central to the current conversations about hard and soft power—what instruments
are most appropriate under what circumstances. One requires a firm familiarity of the full repertoire or inventory of the *instruments of statecraft*. Smart power means knowing the strengths and limitations of each instrument. What can armies be expected to achieve? What can targeted broadcasts do? What can exchange programs achieve? Furthermore, one needs the capacity to recognize *when to use* one kind of power rather than another to achieve national purposes, depending on the context. This is related to the wisdom to know how to *combine* the elements of coercive power with the power to persuade and to inspire emulation (i.e., to combine soft and hard power). It helps to be familiar with *past instances* of effective combinations of hard and soft power, as guides for the present and the future. Finally, a genuinely sophisticated smart power approach comes with the awareness that hard and soft power constitute not simply neutral “instruments” to be wielded neutrally by an enlightened, all-knowing, and independent philosopher king; they themselves constitute *separate and distinct institutions and institutional cultures* that exert their own normative influences over their members, each with its own attitudes, incentives, and anticipated career paths.

**Institutional Challenges**

Rigorous concepts and definitions of smart power are essential, but the design and conduct of smart power always takes place in a practical institutional context. The institutional landscape for hard and soft power is simultaneously very simple and quite complex. Simply put, the institutions of hard power are vastly, disproportionately larger, better funded, and more influential than the institutions of soft power. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) has a budget of upwards of $260 billion, with 3 million people under its authority. By contrast, the central core of soft power (including public diplomacy, or PD) is located mainly in the State Department, an agency with a budget only a fraction of the Pentagon’s—about $10 billion requested for 2008 (U.S. Department of State Budget 2008)—of which public diplomacy accounts for only a small proportion, approximately $1.5 billion (U.S. International Information Programs 2008). Even if we add in portions of the budgets for USAID, or the Trade Development Authority, we are still at only a tiny fraction of what is spent across the river at DOD (Office of Management and Budget 2005).

Within this one simple fact of institutional asymmetry lurk huge complexities. Size, status, budget, and institutional culture shape the exercise of power. Smart power perspectives need to come out of smarter institutions.

A rational foreign policy based on smart power means recognizing and reforming a variety of institutional forms and relationships across a plethora of existing agencies, offices, bureaus, and departments, all of which have their own norms, values, and rigidities (Halperin and Kanter 1973). Any talk of achieving smart power must begin by admitting that the current institutional arrangement constitutes a major stumbling block. Institutional fixes are notoriously complicated.
There is neither one Ministry of Hard Power nor a single Department of Soft Power Affairs. And certainly there is not a Department of Smart Power. In all countries, in the real world of public policy, the powers to coerce and the powers to persuade are spread across a variety of agencies. However, the spread is lumpy and unequal. The institutional reality is that the soft power institutions are in a subordinate position, lacking the resources and clout of their hard power counterparts. As cited above, hard power institutions certainly dominate in Washington, making it difficult to sustain a balanced strategy within government and beyond because the soft power side of the equation lacks the clout to win the interinstitutional policy debates. In addition, senior political leaders increasingly lack confidence in the ability of the soft power institutions of USAID, or the State Department, to do their job.

Traditionally, all the foreign policy and security agencies possess internal cultures that make it difficult to cooperate and thereby decrease the chances of achieving smart power. There are few long-lasting incentives for interagency cooperation, and institutional rigidities are visible in all the foreign policy and national security agencies. The culture of the State Department is currently tangled up in an antiquated slow-moving system of recruitment, promotion, and retention demonstrably unsuited for the fast pace of the modern world. Far-reaching reforms have been frozen for years by norms and expectations very difficult to change. The intelligence community is another classic case of outmoded norms and procedures inappropriate for radically changed circumstances, from recruitment and training rules, to requirements for promotion, to the incentives in place that retain vertical stovepipe structure at the expense of professional mobility around the community that would foster information sharing and innovation.

An interesting and potentially instructive road to governmental reform has been the experience of the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA), a twenty-year campaign since the time of the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986 in which Congress required more "jointness" across the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. Goldwater-Nichols arguably has made the armed forces smarter about the conduct of modern warfare through greater interservice cooperation. One change was to require that officers seeking promotion had to have some joint forces experience (Ross et al. 2002). As Lahneman (2007) and Nolte (2004) have observed, there have also been steps toward a "Revolution in Intelligence Affairs," but despite some policy and organizational changes, there remains much to be done.

There has not yet been a revolution in diplomatic affairs, although U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did press the department to change through her call for "transformational diplomacy." She expressed her wish to make State "smarter" by "transform[ing] old diplomatic institutions to serve new diplomatic purposes." Rice noted that "transformational diplomacy is rooted in partnership; not paternalism. In doing things with people, not for them, we seek to use America's diplomatic power to help foreign citizens better their own lives and to build their own nations and to transform their own futures." Rice conceded that shifts in priorities will be "the work of a generation," but she said it will start with
a “down payment” by shifting one hundred positions to “countries like China and India and Nigeria and Lebanon” (Rice 2005). Still, this is very much a work in progress.

In the United States, arrangements for integration and balance are worked out through what is called the “interagency process,” often but not always led by the National Security Council (NSC) on behalf of the White House (Rothkopf 2006). This is the locus where programs and policy instruments are supposed to be integrated. Traditionally, the role of the NSC is to recommend policy options to the president, including combinations of instruments to be used, and then to oversee their effective implementation. In some cases, particular line departments are given the lead role, whether State, Defense, or Commerce. The coordinating role of the NSC will be a very important component of any smart power reforms, but as anyone who has served as a senior staff member at the NSC can attest, guaranteeing a seat for a soft power or smart power coordinator on the NSC staff is not itself an adequate fix in the absence of the strategic and political reforms called for in this article.

Every institution, of course, carries its own culture and way of looking at the world. Institutional incentives of promotion and pay, organizational procedures, and internal norms and expectations shape the worldview of the key players. There is a “State Department perspective” on the world, and a “Defense Department perspective,” and the two differ substantially. Pursuing smart power cooperation means recognizing those cultural differences and incorporating some and dampening others where appropriate in any reformed interagency processes.

In the past, institutional matters have probably been given too much attention as well as too little. There is a tendency among some public diplomacy advocates to pay too much attention to the institutional arrangements of smart power. Moving around boxes on organizational charts has been a preoccupation of many of the various blue ribbon panels and high-level task forces over the past several decades (U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 2003; Council on Foreign Relations 2003). Such calls for institutional reform can sometimes feel like moving around the deckchairs on the Titanic rather than simultaneously addressing the tougher conceptual and political contexts. Ultimately, the ability to create sensible institutional arrangements hinges on the willingness of a nation’s leader to recognize the institutional rigidities that thwart smart power, and root them out, while mobilizing a political constituency in support of long-term institutional reform.

Political Challenges

At the end of the day, the effectiveness of any foreign policy is a matter of power and politics. In democracies, priorities are set by elected political leaders. Smart power in foreign policy rests on politics and power as much as it draws on robust concepts and nimble institutional arrangements. By itself, a good idea for
reform will not carry the day. A good reform proposal introduced into a welcoming institution has a better chance of success. Add leadership and an influential constituency and the reform idea can gain real traction. This is as true for foreign policy reform as it is for domestic campaigns.

Not surprisingly, the political asymmetries of hard and soft power are just as skewed as the institutional imbalances. The allies of hard power are much more numerous, visible, and powerful than their soft power counterparts. Each congressional district has some substantial expression of the institutional power of the Department of Defense, military bases, veterans’ hospitals, and the like, on which thousands of workers depend for their livelihood. Thousands of private sector workers are employed by defense contractors, and their executives hire lobbyists and support advocates of continued defense-related expenditures. Lots of workers and companies translate into lots of votes in favor of hard power resources.

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Soft power has few such natural political connections. A handful of professional organizations regularly call for greater attention to diplomacy, often led by former diplomats. But there is simply no counterpart to the huge political base of the hard power community. Instead, the firm advocates of soft power and its wider introduction into foreign policy making exist as scattered public intellectuals in various think tanks and universities, or the occasional consulting group.

However, we are at a structural and conjectural moment when the failures of the recent past may be pushing the average citizen and voter to demand a new kind of foreign policy. Polling data suggest that Americans want a better balance between unilateral and multilateral actions, between the imperatives of power and the possibilities for ethical policies, between hard power and soft. This turning of the tide is occurring, of course, in the run-up to the 2008 presidential election. In this presidential election, these issues are already central to the public agenda. Matters of soft and hard power balances that normally remain far in the background are more likely to be addressed front and center because of the widespread citizen responses to the structural and conjectural changes described earlier.

There are several concrete political steps that smart power reformers can pursue during this critical political season. One is to seek opportunities to affect party platforms, both Republican and Democratic. Another complementary step
is to immediately and aggressively engage with the foreign policy and national security teams of the 2008 presidential candidates on the value of smart power and resist waiting for the conventions. I underscore “smart power” and not “soft power.” From my experience as an advisor on the national security team in several presidential campaigns, I observe that candidates typically select foreign policy intellectuals with a comprehensive view of international affairs as their very top advisors, and more often than not, whether Democrats or Republicans, they select individuals with solid realpolitik perspectives. These top aids are charged with integrating specific issues into a national security and foreign policy approach with which the candidate feels comfortable, and which over time the candidate makes his (or her) own. Soft power principles and programs find their way into primary and general election speeches only with great difficulty, driven out by the national security exigencies of the moment, the political pressures to appear hard and strong in public pronouncements, and the views of the closest advisors. In this environment, an appeal to soft power too often sounds limp and carries less weight than a more sophisticated appeal to smart power. Moving forward, smart power must begin with the assumption that hard power is essential, and the national interest is best advanced by effectively combining hard power and soft. Smart power advocates must learn to articulate the advantages of soft power combined with hard power in a language that is politically compelling. In the 2008 campaign, one can only hope that competence in combining hard and soft power in pursuit of a compelling national vision will be a key criterion for the man or woman we elect as the next president of the United States.

Conclusion

Achieving smart power requires artfully combining conceptual, institutional, and political elements into a reform movement capable of sustaining foreign policy innovations into the future (including into the 2012 presidential campaign and beyond). In other words, smart power needs a smart campaign. The power of communications and rhetoric must be brought to bear on selling smart power just as it is mobilized so effectively on behalf of hard power. The irony, of course, is that the advocates of soft power and public diplomacy have been routed by the proponents of hard power, in part because the latter are such effective users of soft power techniques.

America’s political leadership has to step up to meet these conceptual, institutional, and political challenges. Conceptually, policy intellectuals have to reframe hard and soft power to demonstrate the benefits of each and indicate how they can be more intelligently integrated and balanced in the design and conduct of American foreign policy. They must argue that achieving and sustaining smart power is not just a nice thing to do. It has become an urgent matter of national security, and it needs to be done well and done now.

Making this case convincingly will require both scholarly and technical writing as well as communicating through popular media to sway informed opinion in
foreign affairs. Over the long haul, it requires enhancing the education of the American public about the need for smart power. This means new curricula in our secondary schools and universities, and especially in the institutions that prepare the foreign policy elite, including the National Defense University, the Foreign Policy Institute, the service academies, and leading private schools like the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University and Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

In other words, the institutional landscape of hard and soft power needs to be reformed. The gross asymmetries between hard and soft power agencies in budget, clout, and organizational effectiveness must be redressed as a serious matter of high national interest.

Finally, linking ideas and institutional outcomes is politics. Unless a small but expanding group of leaders with substantial national political standing are willing to jump into the fray and powerfully frame a national debate on these reforms, then achieving smart power will be unlikely. To do so requires a constant and consistent drumbeat on the need for “smartness” and a concerted effort to create and sustain a political coalition that crosses political parties and links respected experts from the “two cultures”—military/national security and public/traditional diplomacy and global affairs. The recent “Smart Power” initiative by the CSIS is therefore a step in the right direction.

The good news for such an appeal to smart power is that the picture is not quite as bleak nor as black-and-white as it might appear. For their part, the brass at the Pentagon are much more engaged in thinking seriously about a wide variety of soft power activities. One flavor of Pentagon thinking is puzzling through how soft power can advance traditional war-fighting responsibilities. For example, increasing attention is paid to using the precepts of public diplomacy to gain the respect and support of potentially hostile populations where the Army or Marines are conducting traditional battle operations or to retraining soldiers in the public affairs function to use and respond to blogging to publicize the brutal tactics of hostile terrorists. The other flavor in soft power is what the Pentagon calls OOTW—Operations Other than War. The rules, tactics, and competencies for humanitarian intervention, for example, rest more on precepts of public diplomacy and soft power than does conventional warfare. And across the board, military leaders (like those in the intelligence services) are trying to enhance the cultural competencies of soldiers through better language training and better knowledge of local people. Interestingly, the internal tensions involved with these changes inside the military, and the external tensions between the hard power and the soft power agencies (Defense vs. State) are emerging fully blown in the recent sharp debates over the purposes and competencies required to stand up the new U.S. Africa Command (USAfricom).

On the soft power side of the street, in addition to Secretary Rice’s “transformational diplomacy,” Karen Hughes, the former under secretary of state responsible for public diplomacy, made some significant changes in how her unit thinks about its soft power activities, although they have yet to make big impacts in overall policy. Nor is it clear how much the U.S. State Department is doing to work more effectively with the hard power organizations.
Given the complexity of these problems—conceptual, institutional, political, and cultural—smart power will not be easy to achieve, especially in the short term. Frankly, this is a generational adjustment driven by structural imperatives. To launch this long march, smart power advocates need to become more sophisticated at soft power and communicate their message more convincingly. Public diplomacy services are superb at telling everyone’s story but their own, a liability I observed at close hand in the dying days of the late lamented United States Information Agency (USIA).

Soft power advocates need to be more convincing that their particular strengths can advance the national well-being, and be much more Machiavellian about how to do so. The hard power advocates need to be willing to admit publicly what they readily admit in private at conferences and side conversations: good diplomacy can prevent bad military conflicts. Distinguished diplomacy can make it unnecessary for the Pentagon to commit troops and risk soldiers’ death and injury. Even with the weakness of current U.S. diplomatic structures, the military needs to resist the temptation to do everything on its own. Instead, military leaders should do something that may seem irrational from a bureaucratic perspective—they should advocate for additional budgetary resources for other agencies. Unless we give the country the institutions, the ideas, and the policies America deserves, then our children and grandchildren will pay the cost of this generation’s inability to wield power intelligently and strategically—in other words, to wield smart power.

Notes

1. The project on “Hard Power, Soft Power, Smart Power” is an initiative based at the Center for Public Diplomacy in the Annenberg School for Communication at the University of Southern California in Los Angeles. Its purpose is to develop an innovative approach to national power that allows senior policy makers to better integrate the assets and tools of coercive power (hard power) such as military action with the resources of traditional and public diplomacy (soft power). The project maintains a blog (www.smartpowerblog.org) and an ongoing research program that is developing a glossary of terms, bibliographies, and a public seminar. The director of the Smart Power Project is the author of this article, which also draws on the plenary address the author gave to the international conference on Public Diplomacy, hosted by the U.K. Foreign Office at its Wilton Park site in 2006.

2. In his more recent work, Nye has also introduced the term “smart power,” but his formulation differs from the one offered here. In policy analysis, I believe smart power should be the central framing concept under which hard and soft power are subsumed. But readers are urged to revisit Nye’s use of the term, including the “smart power” group assembled by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

3. Taken together, these assumptions insist on the importance of the context of power. What is “smart” in one context may not be smart in the next. A smart strategy in Afghanistan may not be a smart strategy in Iraq. A strategy that is smart in April may turn out to be not so smart in May. Each of the instruments of power has its own timetables—soft power often takes many years to work, while a hard power air strike can take place in a moment’s notice. The imperatives of time and geography largely determine if a strategy will be smart. Combining soft and hard power effectively means recognizing their interrelationships as well as their distinctiveness. These influences can flow in both directions. For example, hard power can and typically does amplify soft power. One is more likely to listen very carefully to nations with nuclear weapons. Pakistan is likely to listen carefully to India, a contiguous neighbor with both a large conventional standing army and ample nuclear assets. At the same time, the effective use of soft power can amplify hard resources. France’s long-term ties to francophone Africa rested for decades on the daily uses of soft power.
including language, combined with the judicious uses of military intervention when necessary to back up its economic and cultural influences.

4. The budget provides $460 million for programs that foster independent media sources, pluralist political parties, voter education, election monitoring, and human rights in nondemocratic countries as well as $988 million to promote governance and rule of law in countries committed to reform. The budget also provides $80 million for the National Endowment for Democracy.

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